Shivering outside of Houston’s Toyota Center, I was aggressively tapped on the shoulder by an overzealous security officer informing me I needed to take my backpack off so it could be searched at the main entrance. By that point, my friends and I had already been waiting in line for more than an hour while it rained and street preachers, equipped with bullhorns, verbally accosted us.

Now, while Passion 2016, the Christian conference we were attending, was so incredibly worth all of that, I need to point out that the majority of those safety measures we suffered through were essentially ineffective as more than just basic threat deterrents.

The reason for this is if anyone had seriously wanted to wreak havoc on our concentration of 10,000 Christians, they would not have attempted to pull that off by waiting in line and then walking through the metal detectors at the entrance. Instead, they most likely would have constructed a much more clever and conniving plan that we might not have seen coming thanks to our preoccupation with searching bags for bombs and contraband snacks.

This issue of the “security theater,” which Wikipedia defines as “the practice of investing in countermeasures intended to provide the feeling of improved security while doing little or nothing to actually achieve it,” was first introduced to me by Adam Conover on his show “Adam Ruins Everything.”

Since the beginning of our national effort to focus on enhancing security, these security theaters have become a greater problem in the U.S. as technology progresses, but our safety precautions don’t.

For instance, look at our airport security systems. Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, we have been working to prevent another attack of the exact same nature instead of thinking of new points of vulnerability and working to boost the security in those areas. In fact, Conover goes on to quote a Good Morning America exclusive which exposed the fact that “When Homeland Security tested (the TSA), the TSA failed to find mock weapons and explosives 95 percent of the time.”

That means the organization which we are counting on to keep us safe when we travel finds about as many safety threats as your browser’s pop-up blocker. The bottom line is, we have implemented a great many security measures that really don’t do more than make us feel safe. Hence the term, “security theater.”

Conover also references an editorial in the Wall Street Journal by Kip Hawley, when he answers his own question by saying, “What has stopped terrorist attacks? All of the other safety measures we’ve added since 9/11. Like reinforced cockpit blast doors.”

Another example he gives of measures that actually prevent attacks — like mass shootings or suicide bombings — is the heightened awareness of Americans. As long as we keep one eye peeled for signs of potential threats, we’re contributing to the overall safety of ourselves and everyone around us.

But winding security lines, metal detectors, mini shampoo bottles and letting someone rifle through our personal belongings really doesn’t do a whole lot to protect us from the threats that end up making it onto our news feeds. Yes, they might prevent someone from attacking us lazily, but we can’t stop there.

Jeffrey Goldberg, an editorialist for the Atlantic, has been conducting casual studies on the realities of “security theater” for some time now and, in his article titled “The Things He Carried,” Goldberg shows the extent to which security agencies (particularly the TSA) are essentially useless. He wrote, “I’ve amassed an inspiring collection of al-Qaeda T-shirts, Islamic Jihad flags, Hezbollah videotapes, and inflatable Yasir Arafat dolls (really). All of these things I’ve carried with me through airports across the country.”

While that might seem like it doesn’t say much, Goldberg goes on to list the other frowned upon items he has toted through airport security: “pocketknives, matches from hotels in Beirut and Peshawar, dust masks, lengths of rope, cigarette lighters, nail clippers, eight-ounce tubes of toothpaste (in [his] front pocket), bottles of Fiji Water (which is foreign), and, of course, box cutters.”

Which can only lead you to ask, “Is he trying to get himself tackled by some hefty TSA officer?” Yes. Yes, he is. However, Goldberg is so confident he won’t get caught, he even flashed a bunch of “counterfeit boarding passes” in one of the most monitored airport restrooms. No, not in a stall. Right there, in the middle of the bathroom. No one even noticed.

And if you are still wondering about all of that paraphernalia he brought through security, you’ll be pleased (or horrified) to know he was only selected for secondary screening four times and “at one screening, (he) was relieved of a pair of nail clippers; during another, a can of shaving cream.”

My point with this column isn’t to generate fear. Instead, I want to make sure that, as the mildly paranoid and sufficiently concerned citizens we are, we don’t let “security theater” distract us from actual security. When lives are on the line, we don’t want to only be defended by an airport security line.